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Abstract
From the view of current conditions and developing trends of the debt scale in
Chinese local government, the debt crisis will explode in the near future if it cannot
be controlled in an effective way. According to the regional distribution in China,
except for Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Hainan, the debt risk is mainly concentrated
in the western region. In a further step, it can be seen that this risk of debt is
resulted by the imbalanced relationship between “power, responsibility, and
interests” which contains non-accordance of debt power (such as debt-financing
power), confusion of debt responsibility (such as debt-management responsibility),
and distortion of debt interests (such as private benefit and public interests). For this
problem to be corrected, using the local government’s debt for private interests
should be prevented, realizing the local debt behavior takes to the "faithful" service
for the public interests. To realize this purpose, it is important to monitor the
relationship between “power, responsibility, and interests,” which is the most
important factor for setting up the debt risk control system of Chinese local
governments. In particular, the control system should include the following aspects.
First, it should find the right time to empower local government with debt power.
Second, on the basis of both positive and negative sides, it should design a system
to restrict the debt responsibility in local government, which is necessary to solve
problems such as new debt, invalid debt, and overdue debt expansion. Third, it
should propose the guidance mechanism to realize the convergence from the
private benefit to the social interests on the local debt.
Keywords: Local government debt, Risk control, “Power, responsibility, and interests”
relationship
Background
At the meeting of the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of
CPC, it was presented that “a management and risk pre-warning mechanism should be
established to regulate the normative and reasonable debt in both of the central and
local governments.” Soon after, the Fourth Plenary Session highlighted that the
borrowing behavior of local government should be standardized by law,1 which mainly
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plays a role of forming an institutional system which could be adjusted with the evolu-
tion of local debt in China. It is either the inevitable choice to control the current risk
or the important goal to reform the financial system in the future of China. With
regard to how to build this institution, it also needs to be explored whether it should
be in theoretical research fields or in practical departments. The institution is consid-
ered a type of stipulation or constraint for responsibility, which aims at avoiding the
abuse of power due to pursuing special interests.2 As far as the debts of local govern-
ment are concerned, being far away from the responsibility constraint would expand
the debt power step by step as the private benefit corrodes social interests. This will
then lead to the debt enlarging blindly, followed by an eventual explosion of the debt
crisis. Therefore, to control and manage the debt risk efficiently, it is necessary to
consider the relationship of debt power, responsibility, and interests.
This research has two goals. On the one hand, it will evaluate and adjust the debt
status of the Chinese local government. On the other hand, by exploring the internal
mechanism which is generated by the local debt, it intends to propose the measure-
ment of precaution against the risk. Referencing relevant articles, this paper tries to
create a new framework for the relationship between the debt “power, responsibil-
ity, and interests” in order to analyze its risk. The research emphasizes revealing
the reason, from the view of imbalance relation of “power, responsibility, and inter-
ests,” why debt behavior brings about non-social interests. Based on this, the
original reason and relevant influential factors about the generation of the debt risk
will be discovered, and then the long-term predicament of how to control it will
be resolved fundamentally.
The evaluation on the debt scale and risk in Chinese local government
By the end of 2010, the debt balance of all Chinese local government was 107,174.91
billion yuan; by the end of 2012, the balance had increased to 158,858.32 billion yuan;
by the end of June in 2013, it had been raised to 178,908.66 billion yuan, which turned
over 59.74 times compared to 2994.82 billion yuan in 1997. Moreover, the rate of
growth in 1998 and 2008 had reached 48.20 % and 61.92 %, respectively, as shown in
Fig. 1.3
Fig. 1 China’s local government debt growth in 1996–2013
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According to the Maastricht Treaty, the critical value of the debt is limited by the
following two aspects. On the one hand, from the view of debt stock, the proportion of
debt balance accounted for in GDP could not surpass 60 %. On the other hand, from
the increments of debt, the proportion of it accounted for in GDP could not surpass
3 %. In the analysis of the local debt status in 2012, the balance proportion was 58.70 %
(which is equal to 158,858.30 billion yuan/27,0591.984 billion yuan × 100 %), which was
close to 60 % (that means the referred critical value). At the same time, the increments
proportion was 9.55 % (which is equal to 25,841.7055 billion yuan/270,591.98 billion
yuan × 100 %), which was much higher than 3 % (the referred critical value). Thus, it
can be seen that even though the debt balance of local government is being controlled,
the new debt has exceeded the warning line. If the growth of the debt cannot be slowed
down, the balance will soon surpass even the critical line. In fact, the risk has been so
dangerous that the crisis may explode at any time.
In addition, from the debt distribution in various provinces (municipalities or autono-
mous regions),6 in 2012 there were many individual provinces over the critical line
(which is 60 %) of the debt balance accounting for the local GDP,7 including Guizhou,
Yunnan, Qinghai, Chongqing, Gansu, Shanghai, Shaanxi, Hainan, Beijing, Jilin, Tianjin,
and Xinjiang. In June of next year, there are seven provinces with a higher proportion
of new debt accounted for in local GDP, namely Guizhou, Gansu, Yunnan, Xinjiang,
Qinghai, Sichuan, and Hubei, the values of which are all over 20 %. Even if Shanghai,
Guangdong, and Shandong are taken to the lower rate of the debt balance in its GDP8
compared with the country’s average level, their values have all exceeded the referred
warning line (which is 3 %). Therefore, this may result in some provinces in the western
region of China being the main concentration and presenting a higher debt risk besides
Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Hainan, as shown in the Figs. 2 and 3.
The core issue of local government debt risk is the long-term and sustainable negative
effect of fiscal deficit which manifests as local government debt. This therefore cannot
form effective and sufficient fiscal income in the future, leading to the inability to
maintain properly the performance of government function, ultimately making the fiscal





































































































































the debt balance accounting for the local GDP
the critical line (which is 60%)
Fig. 2 Distribution for the proportion of local government debt balance to local GDP
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and debt burden ratio beyond the warning line in some areas both indicate the presence
of local government debt risks. It is necessary to be aware that if the local government
debt risk explodes, it will not affect just one city or fiscal province, but under the special
system relationship in China, it will also trigger a systemic fiscal, financial, and economic
crisis throughout the country. From the perspective of lending, the expansion of local
government debt comes from the soft constraint relationship in credit between local gov-
ernment and financial institutions (Liu 2013; Xie and Bai 2013); the local government
debt risk will inevitably spread to the financial system. In addition, the single state
structure of China also determines that the central government will become the “final
paymaster” of local fiscal burden (Huang and Xu 2011; Miao and Fu 2015); the debt risk
of local government will eventually evolve into the central fiscal risks. The study of Fu et
al. (2013) also elaborated that local government debt risk in China will possibly trigger an
economic crisis. Therefore, strengthening the prevention of local government debt risk is
not only the key to running local fiscal sustainability, but also the important premise to
ensure the systemic safety of the economy. However, the most important key is finding






































































































































the proportion of new debt accounting for the local GDP
the critical line (which is 3%)
Fig. 3 Distribution for the proportion of local government new debt to local GDP
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The debt behavior of local government 
(The “dual” role of it) 
Fig. 4 The logic relationship between the debt “power, responsibility, and interests” of the local government.
This figure describes the logic relationship between the debt “power, responsibility, and interests” of the local
government, and should be placed before the title of 3.2
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Analysis on the debt risk of Chinese local government: based on the relationship between
“power, responsibility, and interests”
Local government debt risk in China has been linked directly to the increasing abnormal
behavior of local government debt. Most scholars have attributed the reason for the ex-
pansion of local government debt to the needs of pursuing economic development (Islam
and Hasan, 2007; Lu and Research group of Jingan County branch of People’s Bank of
China 2011; Yang and Li 2013), fiscal resource and power mismatch (Mikesell 2002; Ming
et al. 2011; Yu 2011), the removal of the debt management system (Levine 2011; Yang and
Lu 2013), and other objective conditions. But all of these studies neglected the subjective
behavior selection of local government, especially in the constraint condition that debt
power broke away debt liability, in this situation, the infinite expansion of personal
interests in local government will drive the expansion of local government debt. In the
evolution of local government debt in China, incoordination in the relationship between
“power, responsibility, and interests” which perform in the long term, greatly creates the
conditions for the increase of local government debt.
The reflection of the relations between “power, responsibility, and interests” on local
government debt
“Right” means a kind of interest which is protected by law. In the Modern Chinese
Dictionary (2012), it is defined in the legal field that the power and interests are both
being enjoyed by all citizens according to the law. Therefore, the right itself is com-
bined with power and interests, which means the interests could be possessed only if
the right is compared with the power, and the power could be realized only when the
right is on the basis of the interests. Whether it is the power or the rights, they both
aim at realizing the interests (Qi 2001). However, in the public field, the provision of
power is for achieving public interests. Once this public power separates from, goes
beyond, or goes against the right, non-public interests will inevitably be generated. On
this condition, there is an important logical explanation: although public right is the
common power of citizens and aims at realizing public interests, it is usually held and
exercised by government officers. However, as the officer is also a person, the officer is
also regarded as the main body of private interests. So both private interests and public
interests co-exist, which may result in public power itself being generated from society
in order to seek personal gain in order to rise above the society in return. Generally
speaking, the right of society contains power and interests, and meanwhile it can be
divided into public right and private right. The former is the unification of public
power and public interests and the latter is the unification of private power and private
interests. According to the hypothesis of economists, a person’s for private interests
tends to be endless. Under the limited condition of private power, the realization of it
can only depend on public power, which will bring about a decrease in public interests
or an expansion of public power.
“Responsibility” is an obligation or an assignment for maintaining the common interests.
However, in the field of administration it is regarded as the commitment of punishment or
blame to its own behavior. In the Modern Chinese Dictionary, there are three definitions
for responsibility. First, it can make someone have an ability to take on some duty or obli-
gation; second, it means doing something within one’s duties; third, it points out that
Miao China Finance and Economic Review  (2016) 4:8 Page 5 of 19
someone cannot do something well and therefore has to take all the blame. It can be illus-
trated that responsibility should be separated into both positive and negative sides. Positive
responsibility plays a role in how things should be done; on the contrary, negative responsi-
bility displays an obligate rule of how to be punished if a person does not take care of the
positive side (Ma and Guo 2010). As above, responsibility can also be distinguished into
private responsibility and public responsibility. The former mainly represents a kind of
moral obligation which belongs to voluntary responsibility. The latter is associated with the
endowment of public power, which aims at maintaining social public interests (Qi and Li
2006) and, therefore, it can be regarded as compulsory responsibility.
In general, the relationship of “power, responsibility, and interests” mostly includes
the integration or the asymmetry of right and responsibility. The integrated relation
mainly means the right and the responsibility need to adapt to each other, otherwise
the unintegrated relation that leads to bureaucratic irresponsible behavior will. The
integration of right and responsibility is therefore the basis to protect public interests
from erosion (Qi 1988; Wang 2000). In other words, once endowed with public power,
these public departments have to implement their responsibility for the realization of
public interests. Therefore, it is proved that public interests have become the important
bridge to connect public power with public responsibility. Meanwhile, public responsi-
bility also has another function: to protect public interests from infringement of public
power or to prevent abusing public power to seek private interests. These explanations
amply demonstrate that public power and public responsibility should be unified in
public interests. The asymmetric relation figures out that power is divorced from respon-
sibility. If this asymmetry becomes much more serious, it will be harmful to public inter-
ests, which will cause the chain of power and responsibility to become much more fragile
(Wei and Chen 2005; Guo 2009). The relationship between “power, responsibility, and
interests” proclaims that the unification of public power and public responsibility is the
key influence to maintain public interests, or else it will be damaged by the erosion of
private interests.
The debt of local government belongs to the behavior of public policy so that relevant
power, responsibility, and interests exist. They play different roles in debt. The first as-
pect is about the debt power of local government. The optical debt has its reasonability
and object necessity, which could improve the local economy and bring about more ef-
ficiency, which means it benefits the social development. Therefore, the public would
be willing to endow the power of debt financing and debt management to the local
government. In most foreign countries, local governments have the power to issue
bonds, including whether to borrow the debt, how much debt would be raised, who
would become the creditor and the way of debt financing, etc. In 2014, the government
issued a new “Budget Law” which brings a due power of debt financing to the local
government. While it is clear that debt power is produced by the motivation of public
and collective interests, it is not the private power of someone but the public power
essentially. The second aspect is about the debt interests of local government. Being in
the category of public interests, it mainly intends to make use of the action of debt
financing to increase the capital input of constructing the infrastructure and various
public services, and then make contributions to promote the development and struc-
ture of the economy, improve the quality of life and wellbeing of the public, and reduce
the social cost of the enterprise production. Since the local officer is the person holding
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the debt power, the local debt is not only for achieving the public interests, but also for
pursuing the private benefit which displays political achievement and rent-seeking
profits. From the respective research, the political achievement of profit mainly reflects
a person’s private goal to get a promotion as soon as possible; the local officer takes an
action to replace “expenditure efficiency” with “debt burden” which would lead to
“short-term and high-speed” economic growth. Yaling Tan, the director of the Institute
of Chinese Foreign Exchange Research, says that “the local government makes use of
investment to help realize someone’s achievement rather than improve the local econ-
omy.”9 Rent-seeking profit means some other relevant beneficial subject has to bribe
the officers for pursuing some debt power which transfers or detracts from the local
government and then achieve the private benefit for himself. For example, some credit
preference banks use bribery with the power holders to benefit from a kind of loan with
“low risk, stable income” from the local government. What’s more, some programmers
will distribute the dividends to some power leaders in order to obtain the public welfare
program contracts. It is obvious that the attraction of private benefit will push public
power about the local government debt separating, surpassing, or even deviating from
public interests so that the original public interests will be damaged. The third aspect is
about the debt responsibility of local government. In fact, this role is to restrict a per-
son to use this public power for personal profit. The social public should be the carriers
endowed with the responsibility to the local government, because they are the givers of
public power of local debt financing. On the positive side, the content of responsibility
involves stipulating the issue of how to realize the social interests by the local debt,
such as confirming the debt scale and structure, managing the debt use and efficiency,
redemption of the debt and controlling the risk, and so on. In contrast, on the negative
side, the responsibility mainly means the local government would be punished if it goes
against the social interests from the debt. In practice, this punishment mostly aims at
abusing the debt’s public power to seek personal profit, therefore, this kind of responsi-
bility mainly restricts the local leader’s behavior. For example, this punishment includes
accountability and administrative penalties to the local officers who take debt financing
blindly for the pursuit of short-term economic growth or who accept bribes and distrib-
uted profit from some other related stakeholders. In fact, the responsibility restriction
of local debt behavior is security to preserve the public interests.
From the above exposition, the debt power of local government is endowed by the
social public. The purpose of this is for the realization of public interests which are
brought from the local debt. To safeguard these interests, the public is of the view that
requires the local government to carry out its positive responsibility of relevant debt
management and the negative content regarding the punishment of not undertaking
the positive responsibility. After that, the contract between the local government and
the public is formed, which refers to the relationship between the debt “power, respon-
sibility, and interests.” However, this contract is unstable because the local government
plays a “dual” role, which represents both the public’s benefits and the bureaucrats’
profits. Except for the aim of public interests, there is also private benefit to be realized
by the local government’s debt. Meanwhile, compared to public interests, it is easier for
private benefit to play the leading role.10 As far as private benefit is concerned, it is hid-
den in the relationship contract between the debt “power, responsibility, and interests”
of the local government and the bureaucrats. In this condition, the private power of
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local debt is not valid but the private responsibility needs to support the service for
private interests, which means the “instruction” should be issued that public power will
be used by the officer in local government. Once the local government begins to utilize
the public power of the debt to serve for personal profit, it is appropriate that the social
responsibility of the debt should play a part in the constraint and punishment. If it does
not play a role in that, public power would contribute to the private benefit without
limit, which will cause great damage to public interests. Finally, it would become inevit-
able that the debt will expand in scale and be used indiscriminately. On the other hand,
if the public power of the debt could contribute to the public interests “constantly,” the
private benefit hardly impacts the use of the debt. Thus it shows that the social respon-
sibility of the local debt has an important effect on the coordination between public
power, public interests, and private interests, and it could then make efforts to regulate
the behavior of the local debt and control the risk.
The imbalance reflection of the debt “power, responsibility, and interests” in Chinese
local government
The above research about the relationship between the local debt “power, responsibility,
and interests” shows that both the debt scale expansion and the risk formation are
essentially a result of the debt responsibility being unable to “control” the corrosion
from the government officer. From the current situation of the local debt, it could
come down to the following three reasons:
(i) When the new “Budget Law” of 2014 had not been issued, the local government in
China was not endowed with debt power in principle. But in fact it carried out some
debt financing behavior according to some reasonable, and even unreasonable, terms.
This kind of absence of power, which is in name only, makes an excuse for itself from
the true debt responsibility and supports an opportunity to satisfy private interests.
From the development history of our local debt, there were only a few reasons for the
local government to be allowed to borrow money by the central government. In
1950, the People’s Government in Northeast of China issued “the government bonds
for the production and construction of northeast regions”; in 1958, the government
bonds of “constructing the local economy” were issued in various areas; from 1998,
some national bonds started to lend to local governments; since 2009, central finance
has been commissioning local governments to issue bonds. Except for these actions,
other local debt financing is all beyond legal rights. They could be restrained by some
relative policies, for example as in 1985 when the State Council regulated that the
local government was not being allowed to issue the bond by itself; the Budget Law of
1994 pointed out clearly that the local government had no rights to issue its own
bonds; the amendment of Budget Law in 2012 finally confirmed that local
government had not been allowed to issue its own bonds. These rules illustrated
completely that if there are no debt rights to be endowed to the local government, it
is not allowed to produce the debt, and there is also no reason for the local
government to undertake any social responsibility of the debt for achieving the social
interests. However, the fact is quite the opposite. The local government deliberately
bypasses the action of issuing bonds which is prohibited by the law. Instead, there are
a large number of debts being borrowed by way of the investment and financing
platforms. Taking an example from 2012, deducting 233 billion yuan of legitimate
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municipal bonds which were agent issued by the Ministry of Finance, the new local
debt accounts for over 99 %,11 which is produced under the illegitimate condition of
not endowing the true power of debt financing. That means almost all local
governments are beyond their legal power. It seems that the debt behavior of local
government has been the established fact, which is neither approved by the legal
power nor restrained by the relevant departments. From the above analysis, it could
be summarized that this kind of debt behavior is hard to supervise and restrain (and
therefore hard to regulate its responsibility) because of the lack of political power.
This status then easily brings about the erosion from the private benefit for the power
holders to the public interests, therefore, the debt scale is bound to make grow.
(ii) The lack of debt power in local government results in there being no reason to
regulate and control debt financing. In fact, in China, effective methods for
managing local debt are unavailable and this will turn this essential “unregulated”
behavior to “doing whatever it wants to.” After that, the goal of social interests is
harder to achieve. In fact, the debt responsibility of local government is the
foundation to catch social interests; that is to say, if there is no responsibility to be
undertaken, it is out of the question to realize social interests. However, from the
practical status of Chinese local government debt, since there is no debt power to
be given, the local government has no incentive to allocate the respective
responsibility, which is in agreement with the principal of integration of power and
responsibility. Furthermore, it is even more unlikely to make the main bodies of
holding power regulate the local government undertaking the debt responsibility.
In fact, there have been only a few relevant management rules or methods about
local debt to be approved by the central government, such as “the People’s
Republic of China regulation on the public bonds to construct the local economy”
(which was in 1958) and “the management method of the national debt
transmitting to load the local government” (which was in 1998). Apart from those
issues, the Chinese central government has not announced any other policies to
manage local debt, which involves the local government not being responsible for
anticipating the decision, taking management, and later taking payment in the
process of borrowing, using, and paying the debts. Needless to say, the punishment
for the negative debt responsibility represented by local leaders is not to implement
the debt responsibility actively. The blank of the local debt responsibility will lead
to the private benefit continuous to erode into the social interests, which will
improve the scale expansion of the unreasonable local debt. Of course, it is difficult
to complete the goal of social interests.
(iii)Since the “Fiscal Responsibility System” and “Tax Sharing System” were carried out
in 1978, most local governments have obtained their respective political interests
from economic growth. Because of this, they have the urge to make use of debts to
promote economic development. Based on this, they were seeking the “reasons”
which are advantages for economic progress to expand the debt scale. However,
these “reasons” and the following motivation always have the private benefit
guidance. Different profit guidance will contain different characteristics of local
debt financing. If approving debt financing on the basis of private benefit, local
government could be in accordance with the “reason” of developing the social
economy in order to borrow a large number of debts, and then leaders would gain
the political achievement and rent-seeking profits from it. On the contrary, if
approving debt financing on the basis of social interests, local government has to
control the debt scale by considering the various aspects of the accompanied risk,
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the debt sustainability, and the efficiency of utilizing debts. From the practical
situation in China, without comparing the debt power, local debt financing is not
restricted by the responsibility, which makes it difficult to guarantee the realization
of public interests and has been replaced by private benefit in large degrees. According
to the development history of local debt, before 1978 the local government did not
have any activities to need debt financing’ the most important reason is that, under the
traditional fiscal system of state-monopolized revenue and expenditure, it is almost
impossible to realize political interests by debt financing. On the other hand, this
behavior would create a burden on its own. After the reform and opening-up policy,
the fiscal system moved into the stages of “Fiscal Responsibility System” and “Tax
Sharing System,” which means the better development the more interests for the local
government. In addition, with the two international economic crises, expansionary
fiscal policy had been put into effect, which created the opportunity for debt financing
and made further tide of capital raising for the local government. From the trend, it
can be analyzed that, under the current fiscal system, much of the rapid expansion of
local debt depended on the inadequate views of political achievement; that is to say the
corruption of private interests under unrestricted conditions.
Preventing and controlling the debt risk of local government: realization of the relationship
between the “power, responsibility, and interests”
Based on the above research, if want to prevent and control the debt risk of Chinese
local government, an important step is to realize the relationship between the local
debt power, responsibility, and interests. The core method is to make an effort to pre-
vent social interests from the corruption of private benefit through debt responsibility.
In particular, there are three aspects, which endow the debt power to the local govern-
ment in real time, assuring the debt responsibility of the local government reasonably,
truly transforming the debt interests of the local government.
Timing selection to endow the debt power of the local government
From worldwide experience, local government in most countries owns the debt financing
power, which is ruled clearly by the law and restrained by the relevant provisions. As far
as China is concerned, it is because the debt power has not been given to local govern-
ment and debt responsibility cannot therefore be implemented and social interests will be
corrupted seriously by private benefits. So, why doesn’t the State have legal regulations to
allow local government to issue bonds? In fact, it is just for selecting a suitable time which
means a period with the mature system of the local debt management. There is no harm
in making an assumption that local government has been allowed to issue bonds. Under
this assumption, local government truly has the power to finance debt and could issue
bonds in the public way. However, it also has the respective obligation of being respon-
sible for the debt, or it would be punished by the superior government if it defaults its
responsibility. This unification of debt power and responsibility seems to control the debt
risk effectively, but the necessary condition is the kind of responsibility for the debt
management that should be implemented by local government. In the long term, the
management system of the local debt stays in a “vacuum” situation all the time. It has
been presented that neither the management methods nor the scale and structure of the
local debt should not be held and controlled by the central and local governments, need-
less to say the management responsibility. Therefore, if the local government is
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endowed the financing power under immature conditions, it only results in raising
the debt risk.
Of course, without the endowment of debt power, there would be no exploration to
regulate the debt responsibility of local government. To resolve this contradiction, a
systematic and perfect responsibility policy needs to be set up and this should be
carried out in some pilot regions to manage the local government debt, and then be
extended gradually to other areas. That is to say, accompanied with the debt responsi-
bility being attached and improved nationwide, the power of that could be opened up
step by step. In fact, from the view of issuing “the method of choosing some pilot
regions to issue its own bonds,” selecting Shanghai city, Zhejiang province, Guangdong
province, Shenzhen city, Jiangsu province, and Shandong province as the pilot regions
to issue the local bonds and action being taken by the Ministry of Finance to bring
local government debt into the budget and so on, they all reflect that the responsibility
policy to manage local debt has been building throughout the country. The new
“Budget Law” of 2014 has stipulated that the debt power of local government should be
locally opened up. As this policy is being developed, the local debt power will be
endowed gradually in various regions.
The mechanism design of confirming the debt responsibility of the local government
The confirmation of the debt responsibility of local government is for regulating local
government behavior about debt financing, using, and payment, which involve the
regulation of both positive and negative responsibilities. This is either to supply the
strength for the power endowment or to offer the essential guarantee for social
interests.
(i) Positive responsibility: it is to roll out the supervision mechanism for local debt.
Setting up the mechanism is for restricting the relevant responsibility according to
the different links of debt financing. Based on this, the normative debt management
of local government should be succeeded. In other words, this regulation of the
debt responsibility has a positive sense. Meanwhile, it mainly runs through three
managing steps of debt financing, using, and payment, and the important purpose is
to control the debt expansion about the new debt, valid debt, and overdue debt.
First, aiming at the new debt expansion, a mechanism to supervise debt financing
should be set up. The expansion of the new debt is regarded as the first part of the
debt risk, which is mainly produced by the irrational behavior of local government
borrowing debts from financial institutions. According to this behavior, a system to
restrict debt responsibility should be designed, and this should mainly include three
supervisors such as the social public, the superior government, and the financing
platform. With this, at the beginning, a decision-making mechanism to adjust the
demand of the debt expenditure should be available. It is executed by the social
public (who is one of the supervisors) that they should make their decisions about
whether the debt financing of local government can be acted. Meanwhile, being a
delegate of the social interests, the public have to evaluate the purpose of local
government to create the debt and the sequence of programs which are involved
in some budget plan of debt repayment. Furthermore, based on the demand prefer-
ence of the public services, a plan to design the debt scale and structure would be
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formed. This mechanism mainly involves three parts: the approval mechanism
about departmental revenue and expenditure, the expression of interest mechanism
about the expenditure preference, and the evaluation mechanism about the program
budget. Second, a decision-making mechanism about the ability of local government to
carry the debt should be offered. Being another supervisor, the superior government,
from the consideration of the debt-carrying ability, could decide the debt scale and
structure for the lower levels, which is in order to ensure the optimum
improvement of the debt for social economic development. This mechanism is
mainly contributed by the information collection system, the debt calculation
system, and the leading system for decision. Lastly, it presents the decision-
making mechanism for local debt financing. From the debt paying ability, the
financing platform (being the third supervising body) should be given a right to
adjust the scale and structure of local debt financing, which intend to restrain
local government to repay the debt by itself. It might take actions to set up an
independent financing platform from the government, a debt decision-making system
on this platform, and a financing mechanism. This kind of responsibility restriction
mechanism not only plays a role to satisfy the citizens’ willingness to contribute to
public services with the debt expenditure, but ensures the debt expenditure could be an
advantage for the macroeconomic operation, and even have the possibility of repaying
debts on time.
Regarding the valid debt, a mechanism to supervise debt use should be set up.
In particular, the debt risk also displays whether the local government use it
ineffectively or even excessively. This results in local government blindly making
use of the debt captures to pursue short-term economic growth, which is an
irrational behavior. According to this problem, a system to restrict its responsibility
should be put in place. In this system, the public and the superior government are
the main restricting bodies who both stand for public interests and constrained
power. Among this, both of the mechanisms to restrict debt use and the mechan-
ism to supervise debt efficiency are to be offered. From the former side, it is pointed
out that the public should take action to the internal restriction which has an effect
on the debt before it is used by local government. The goal is to require local
government to make a reasonable budget before debt financing and execute it
strictly, in order to make immune the adverse selection of local government during
the process of the debt use. It involves designing a rigorous budget plan of the
debt expenditure, establishing a rigorous accounting system to examine the debt,
improving the bidding mechanism of the government procurement, and
strengthening the treasury concentrated payment system. From the latter side, it
mainly considers the superior government as the other subject who implements the
external restriction responsibility. A mechanism should be built to evaluate the debt
efficiency, which plays a role to check the local government behavior of debt use since
it has taken place. The purpose is to supervise the local government modifying and
improving its behavior about debt expenditure. It is contributed from establishing some
examined mechanisms aimed at the debt management, the planned outcome, and the
expenditure efficiency. From the above statements, it can be seen that this kind of re-
sponsibility restriction mechanism pursues achievement of the efficiency improvement
of debt use through the main subjects of the public and the superior government.
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However, the restriction from the public emphasizes the action beforehand; on the
contrary, the superior government holds this restriction to subsequent conduct.
Lastly, facing the expansion of the overdue debt, a mechanism to supervise the
repayment should be set up. The debt risk will also be expanded if the local
government cannot implement the repayment responsibility, even though the above
problems about the new debt and the valid debt have been solved. As for the debt
repayment being delayed or defaulted, it should be with the aid of the superior
government, the financing platform, and the social public to establish a system to
restrict the responsibility of the local government. This mechanism mainly involves
three aspects. First, it is the mechanism to evaluate the implementation of the debt
responsibility according to the repayment plan: the superior government should
monitor and examine the main appointed subject with the repayment responsibility
and the progress towards the repayment plan. Confirming who should repay the
debt should be the core task, which refers to establishing the approval and
evaluation system for the repayment plan and the implementation of the debt
responsibility. Different conclusions could be made following the different degrees
of repayment behavior. If there are any conditions that do not mesh with the plan,
this mechanism should be used not only for supervision but also for modification.
Next, it is the mechanism to evaluate the credit rating of the local government
from the default of debt repayment. According to the actual repayment conditions,
this evaluation mechanism should be built by the financing platform. This result
will be important information to be offered to the financing platform, which use it
to adjust the further financing ability of the local government. The inclusions are
the credit rating evaluation mechanism of the local government being contributed
by the financing platform, which depends on the evaluating standard according to
the default extent, as well as the financing influence mechanism being associated
with the credit rating directly. Third, it is the mechanism to reserve some currency
to deal with the repayment. The contribution and improvement would be under the
personal supervision of the social public, which contributes to reduce the default
risk to impact the fiscal normal operation. It mainly contains the decision of the
capital source, the management methods, the used conditions, and so on. This kind
of mechanism to restrict the responsibility both urge the local government to repay
the debt on time and support the financial security to repay the local debt.
(ii) Negative responsibility: a mechanism to punish some misconducts about local debt
behavior should be set up. On the positive side, the restrictions focus on what the
local government should do during these three links of borrowing, using, and
repaying debts. However, local government is not a government with responsibility
under ideal conditions. It can bypass the above supervision mechanism
successfully, and even more through some other ways to expand the debt power
which intends to pursue the private benefit. Therefore, it is necessary to construct
the restriction mechanism on the negative significance. That means local
government would be punished if it is not in accordance with the requirement to
borrow, use, and repay the debt. The ultimate goal is to guarantee the control of
the negative restriction to the positive one. It is worth noting that some violations
of the local debt financing are mainly results of the expansion of private benefits
compared to social interests. That is to say, this punishment is aimed at the
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government bureaucrat instead of the whole social group. As far as the bureaucrat
is concerned, private benefit, which is closely related to local debt, mainly involves
the achievement profit and rent-seeking benefit. Meanwhile, the punishment also
plays a role in preventing social interests from the erosion of these two personal
behaviors. The main process is that the superior government, the public, and the
platform evaluate and examine debt behavior from different views. After that, the
comprehensive report should be completed and then submitted to both the
superior organization and personnel departments and the superior discipline
inspection and supervision departments. After approval, it could become the
basis on which to constrain the debt behavior of local government, especially
including the two important aspects about the evaluation and identification.
On the one hand, the mechanism plays a role in evaluating debt behavior. It is
carried out by three main bodies: the superior government, the social public, and
the financing platform. Among this, the superior government mainly holds the
decision mechanism of debt-carrying ability about the local government, the
supervision mechanism of debt using efficiency, and the evaluation mechanism of
implementing the debt repayment plan; the social public taking this evaluation
mainly relies on the decision mechanism of the demand preference about the debt
expenditure, the restriction mechanism of the debt use, and the reserve mechanism
of the debt repayment; the financing platform taking the evaluation focus on the
decision mechanism of the debt financing about the local government and the
credit rating evaluation mechanism of the debt repayment default. Whatever
anyone makes of any mechanism, the evaluated objects are all behaviors shown
by local government, including the submission and implementation.
On the other hand, the mechanism also identifies the debt behavior of local
government. It is carried out in the same main bodies as listed above: the superior
government, the social public, and the financing platform. They need to submit the
evaluation report separately to both the superior organization and personnel
departments and the superior discipline inspection and supervision departments.
Afterwards, on the basis of this report, they would identify local debt behavior and
then carry out the relevant incentives or punishment policy. Generally speaking, the
organization and personnel departments are mainly in charge of the achievement
identification according to local debt behavior, and use it as the basis to promote,
transfer, or remove some relative local leading cadres, which play a role to prevent
the social interests from the erosion of the achievement interests of the local
officers; the discipline inspection and supervision departments are mainly
responsible for the legal identification to debt behavior of local government,
and on this basis, some relevant leading cadres can be investigated for the legal
responsibility, which aims at preventing the social interests from the erosion of
the rent-seeking benefit.
The guide measure to transform the interest-orientation of the local debt
Transforming the interest-orientation of the local debt, the core purpose is to realize
the convergence from private benefit to social interests, which is regarded as an
endogenous precondition to guide the local government to implement the debt
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responsibility consciously on the subjective sense. In any case, as long as the local
government has the sense to reach the social interests, it is not impossible that the
scale and risk of local debt could be controlled and treated effectively.
(i) The guide measure should emphasize the positive motivation of the private benefit.
The keynote is to develop the government’s officers to raise social responsibility
consciousness in a subjective way and to make the private benefit close to the
social interests continuously in a positive and conscious way. As far as debt
management is concerned, it mainly requires the officers to transform the goal
from the maximum private benefit to the maximum social interests regardless of
the process of debt financing, using, and repaying. But if this transformation is to
be completed from the positive side, the important measure is how to change the
officers’ interest idea from their thoughts. It might contains three steps: from the
view of selection and appointment, on the basis of meeting the ability requirement
for work, their political awareness should be examined more strictly; as for the
civilization and cultivation, some good examples should be offered for influencing
the officers’ behavior so that they could keep the faith consciously; in the respect
of assessment and incentive, their confidence and motivation should be enhanced
to uphold the social interests.
(ii) The negative erosion of the private benefit to the social interests should be restrained.
The important reason why private benefit is difficult to get close to social interests is
that there are a great many different interests available for achieving the private
demand, such as the “political achievement” profit, rent-seeking benefit, and others.
However, the unlimited private demand would bring about the unrestricted
expansion of these interests. If this action could be restricted effectively, the officers
will not have any opportunity to reach the private interest. Under this condition, they
have no choice to consider the social demands so that the convergence would be
succeeded from the private benefit to the social interests. Of course, this measure in
itself is considered by the thought of “constraint” so that it should be accompanied
with a perfect action system of “constraint.” As far as the “political achievement”
profit and rent-seeking benefit are concerned, both are widely found to achieve the
personal interests though producing debts. To resolve these problems, on the one
side, it should aim at changing the “political achievement” idea completely, the
particular methods of which include the long-term economic effect generated from
the debt expenditure and the responsible risk produced later which are both regarded
as the evaluating standards to examine the social interests. It also bought into the
scope of the political achievement assessment; on the other hand, it should focus on
rent-seeking during the debt process. As for this behavior, the punishment should be
taken severely. With any lawbreaking activities referring to debts, the leader of local
government should suffer from the harshest punishment; at the same time, other
officers should be on the alert so that their perverse motives of seeking rent profit
can be quashed.
(iii)This measure should eliminate the responsible transformation about the behavior
to pursue private interests. The reason for not implementing the responsibility of
debt management is that local officers have seen that the debt responsibility could
be transferred in various methods, such as transforming into the superior
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government and the next government. Therefore, to actually realize the conscious
implementation on local debt management responsibility, more efforts to eliminate
the transferring anticipation are needed, which is in order to reach the private
benefit and drive the independence of local government on the acceptance of the
debt responsibility. In particular, the contents are as follows: for one thing, it
should weaken the space transformation anticipation of the debt responsibility as
for expecting the debt aid from the central government. For example, the central
government should adopt some punishment measures which are used to dismiss
and punish the local officers who have not undertaken the debt responsibility, but
that is what they should be doing. After that, local government could also obtain
help from the central government. However, it must pay a high price as the
administrative penalty. For another, it should weaken the time transformation
anticipation as well which transfers the debt responsibility into the next
government. Try to clearly define the local government responsibility of the debt
financing and using, to help hold it accountable. Meanwhile, this responsibility
must be accompanied by the relevant officer at all times, whether he has been
transferred or even promoted.
Conclusions
This paper tries to resolve the unbalanced relationship between the “power, responsibility,
and interests” of local debt in China, which is on the view of the power endowment, the
responsibility restriction, and the interest transformation. The goal is to afford some les-
sons to control the local debt risk in China. However, to operate the above mechanisms, it
depends on the safeguard which is formed by the institution perfection and the policy ad-
justment in the macro field. In practical terms, the first one is to ensure the legal basis for
the debt power and responsibility. The power is the operation start and the responsibility
is the code of conduct. In case of missing the restriction to the power and responsibility,
the debt will be expanded as it is much harder to shake off the erosion of private benefit.
Thus, the legal norm must be established for carrying the power and responsibility of the
local debt, which is really the way in favor of the functional running of the debt manage-
ment mechanism. The second one is to change the idea of the local officers as for the
achievement assessment. As far as debt management is concerned, to help change this
idea, try to consider some indicators of the local debt cost with spillovers into the examin-
ation system, which involve the debt efficiency, the debt risk, and so on. The purpose is to
make local government have the sense of the debt responsibility while developing the
economy. The third one is to guarantee basic financing for improving local development.
For some factors such as the political system the local government can hardly provide
enough money, the financial gap will be more serious, and the demand to the debt will
become more urgent as well. The more serious this gap, the easier it is to cover up the
irrational and irregular behavior of debt financing. So try to establish and perfect the basic
financing safeguard mechanism at all levels of government, to eliminate any possibility of
the local debt financing blindly. The next one is to set up a budget system to manage the
local debt. From the consideration, the governments at all levels should have more em-
phasis on how to build a budget system meeting the requirements of the modern budget
system. One of the important reasons is that only by bringing the local debt into the
budget management can the scale be controlled effectively and be managed regularly. In a
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further step, this will lead the continuous debt expansion and then make a threat to the
financial, monetary, and economic security in the whole country. The last one is to
enhance the information disclosure mechanism of the local debt. If there is a large
amount of non-transparent information about local debt, it would bring about many of
them being outside the statistics and kept in the invisible position. The more important is
the behavior about the relevant debt power is difficult to supervise and control. As a
result, it is necessary to establish a perfect mechanism to disclose the information of the
local debt, which needs to improve the accounting system, strengthen the auditing
mechanism, and regulate the system of statistical management and so on.
Fortunately, from the recent corresponding reform of the local government debt, the
state is continuously changing the abnormal relationship between the “power, responsi-
bility, and interests.” The essential purposes are focusing on intensifying the social
responsibility of the local government, realizing the private benefit of the local govern-
ment on the debt converging to the social interests of that and guaranteeing the normal
increase of the debt. From the developing progress: at the beginning of 2011, the
central government tried to select some regions as pilots to put into force a policy
allowing the local government to issue the debt by itself. In fact, this action expresses
that the central government has been endowing the power of issuing debts to the local
government in some areas, which intends to create a policy to be available widely for
managing local government debt. It will lay the foundation for restraining the local gov-
ernment’s behavior from the debt responsibility in the future. On 6 December 2013,
“the notice on the improvement to examine the political achievement for the local
party and government leading bodies and other leading cadres,”12 which has been
issued by the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, put for-
ward clearly that “the government debt is regarded as an important index to examine
the political achievement, … what some problems such as ‘the new leader ignoring the
old debt’ and ‘taking up the offspring resource’ are being the important reference to
evaluate the leading bodies and cadres,” meanwhile, “as for borrowing blindly to make
a large of bad debts, this action must be on the record and then the officer must be
given the punishment by the organization or on the party or policy discipline according
to the circumstances, even referring to the departed leaders.” This measure is actually
of the view of the political achievement to enhance the sense of the local government
to undertake the debt responsibility. On the one hand, the irrational political achieve-
ment concept should be corrected through examination; on the other hand, the power
to borrow the debt blindly should be restricted by the responsibility life tenure. In
2014, the new “Budget Law” has been issued, which plays a role of the debt power of
the local government being endowed properly so that it makes a foundation for
confirming the debt management responsibility of the local government.
Endnotes
1The data come from the National Finance of Sina website, “Japanese Media Making
a view on the Fourth Plenary Session: China Will Control the Local Government from
the Local Debt”, http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20141024/220020636832.shtml.
2In the Modern Chinese Dictionary, institution is regarded as an operation regulation
or an action principle which require everyone to abide by. New institutional economics
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consider that institution is the regulation aggregation, is a series of the regulation
network that are composed of formal constraint and informal constraint.
3The data mainly come from “the audit result of local government debt in Chia” (the
35th file in 2011) and “the audit result of governmental debt in China” (the 32nd file in
2013), which are both offered by the National Audit Administration of the PRC.
Because the data are not published every year, the data in 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004,
2005, 2006, and 2011 of Fig. 1 were calculated in the average, on the basis of annual
increase which was published by Auditing Administration.
4Referring to the research of Liu Rong and Huang Hong (2012), the central GDP and
the local GDP are converted separately according to the proportionate relation between
the local financial income and the central financial income. Otherwise, the evaluation
of debt risk of local government should adopt the local GDP.
5The new debt of local government in 2012 is calculated by the average debt
increment of this year which is relative to the year 2010.
6Xizang has not published the debt itself, so this research has no idea to take consid-
eration about this province. Moreover, Guizhou and Tianjin have not announced the
debt balance of the end of 2012 so that we only adapt the backward step-by-step
method according to the balance of June in 2013 and the average debt growth of local
government in the whole country.
7Except for Xizang, the local GDP in various regions is being calculated by the
national GDP and the share of its own financial income to the total national financial
income.
8The new debt of local government mainly considers the growth of half a year from
the end of 2012 to June of 2013, relatively, the GDP also only regard the accumulated
value of the second quarter in 2013.
9The data come from the China News Service website, “the investment and financing
channel being suspected, a large number infrastructure being blamed for the govern-
ment’s achievement,” (27 August 2012), http://finance.chinanews.com/cj/2012/08-27/
4134493.shtml.
10Yu Xiao (2005) suggests that there is the individual rationality as well as the social
rationality in the human brain. The role of the individual rationality is produced natur-
ally and does not need the education and the regulation of the institution. Besides, the
social rationality plays a role of advocacy and education, that is to say, it need to be
realized by the external compelling force and the public opinion. Reference on the
website of law information in Peking University, http://article.chinalawinfo.com/arti-
cle_print.asp?articleid = 35389.
11The data come from the China News Service website, “Ministry of Finance has been
approved to issue municipal bonds as agent for 233 billion yuan in 2012” (30 July
2012), http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20120730/200212709866.shtml.
12The data come from “the notice on the improvement to examine the political
achievement for the local party and government leading bodies and other leading
cadres” being issued by the Organization Department of the Central Committee of
the CPC, (the legal library, 6 December 2013), http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_
view.asp?id = 438166.
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